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BRIEF STATEMENT SHOWING THE JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
Jurisdiction of this court is conferred by § 78-2(a)-3(2)(h) and (j), Utah Code Ann.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the court err in finding:
a.

That the Decree of Divorce awarded the two subject parcels of

real property to the plaintiff.
b.

That the defendant had negotiated in bad faith.

c.

That there was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted

the testimony given by the plaintiff regarding the real property that is the subject matter of
this appeal.
Standard of Review: The findings will be upheld unless the court determines that the
findings are clearly erroneous. Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1987).
2.

Whether the court abused it discretion in awarding attorney's fees to

the plaintiff.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah
1993).
3.

Whether the court made sufficient findings to support its finding that

there was a marital interest in the subject property.

1

Standard of Review: Whether the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. Atkins v. Deliran, 131 P.2d
966 (Utah 1987).
4.

Whether the court committed error in granting the plaintiffs Verified

Petition for Modification.
Standard of Review: Whether the court's decision as to modification constituted an
abuse of discretion. Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This appeal is from the Judgment and Order dated March 29, 1996 of the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable William H. Bohling presiding, which granted the
plaintiffs Verified Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition
1.

The parties to this appeal were husband and wife, having married on

April 25, 1974.
2.

The plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce on or about July 6, 1990.

3.

On or about August 27, 1990, the parties appeared before The

Honorable Domestic Relations Commissioner, Michael S. Evans, on the Defendant's Motion
for Order to Show Cause. At that time the parties stipulated that they should be restrained
from jeopardizing marital assets.
2

4.

The divorce was to be heard on July 2, 1991. On July 2, 1991, the

parties pursued negotiations that resulted in a stipulation. One of the issues was whether
there was a marital interest in two parcels of real property located in North Salt Lake.
During those negotiations, it was the defendant's position that there was no marital interest,
and had been no marital or individual interest in the two parcels of real property, and that
the defendant's name had been placed on the title along with the defendant's mother in
order to protect her father. Regarding the pieces of property, the parties agreed that
whatever interest the defendant had in those properties, either individually or as marital
property, as of July 6, 1990 would be awarded to the plaintiff. The stipulation that was read
into the record by the defendant's counsel referred to the two parcels as follows:
There was some other property which, of course, the defendant has
claimed was not marital property. It is our agreement that if it should be
determined that there is a marital interest in the property other than the 10.7
acres and the residential property that it would go completely to the plaintiff
free and clear of any interest of the defendant. (Transcript of 7/2/91, p. 2,
11. 24, 25; p. 3, 11. 1-5).
5.

Plaintiff counsel was given an opportunity to clarify or make any

additions to the Stipulation that was read into the record. Regarding the two parcels of real
property that are the subject of this appeal, the defendant's counsel stated:
There are in our view, Judge, two pieces of real property and I want
to be clear on this one point, two pieces of property in addition to the 10.7
acres in North Salt Lake and the marital residence, which my client claims
there is an interest either in himself, the two of them, or in the defendant by
herself, and it's the agreement between the parties that whatever interest she
may have in reference to both the individual capacity or as a marital estate,
3

would be conveyed to my client, if any. (Transcript of 7/2/91, p. 4,1. 25; p. 5,
11. 1-9).
6.

On or about July 7, 1993, the plaintiff filed a Verified Petition to

Modify the Decree of Divorce.

The plaintiff alleged in the Petition to Modify that

"notwithstanding the express court order prohibiting the defendant from selling the property,
as well as the express agreement made and entered into in open court, the defendant has
sold the same and taken the benefits of the same as her sole and separate property."
7.

On or about November 4, 1990 the defendant answered the Verified

Petition to Modify. As an affirmative defense, the defendant stated that, "The plaintiffs
Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted."
8.

On January 9, 1995, the Verified Petition for Modifying the Decree of

Divorce came on for trial. Among other findings not material to this appeal, the court made
the following findings that are pertinent to the appeal:
a.

That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, prepared by Mr. Harry

Caston of McKay, Burton and Thurman, Attorneys for Defendant, the plaintiff David
Costanzo, was awarded two parcels of property, one of 3.1 acres and another of 3.47 acres
in North Salt Lake, and the defendant was awarded a single parcel of 10.7 acres in North
Salt Lake. (Findings of Fact, 112).
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b.

That sometime in the month of April, 1991, the defendant signed

two warranty deeds conveying her interest in the two parcels awarded to plaintiff, referred
to in paragraph #2 above, to the defendant's mother and sister, without either disclosing the
same to plaintiff or otherwise obtaining authorization from the Court. (Findings of Fact, 117).
c.

That the parties stipulated to the appraisal prepared by Jerry

Webber, as being admitted into evidence, which showed the fair market value of the said
two parcels in 1994 to be $105,200.00. (Findings of Fact, 118).
d.

That the defendant testified while on the stand during cross

examination that her original pleadings stated that the property in North Salt Lake, should
be awarded to the plaintiff and that she be awarded one-half of the value of the same, with
no mention that the property did not belong to the parties. (Findings of Fact, 119).
e.

That the defendant testified while on the stand during cross

examination that her affidavit filed as the Financial Declaration of the defendant, that the
property in North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the plaintiff and that she be awarded
one-half of the value of the same, with no mention that the property did not belong to the
parties. (Findings of Fact, 1110).
f.

That the statements made by the defendant that the parties had

no interest in the said property, is inconsistent with the pleadings filed by the defendant, and
inconsistent with the affidavit filed by the defendant, prior to the granting of the subject

5

divorce, and therefore the Court does not find her testimony regarding the parties interest
in the subject property to be credible. (Findings of Fact, 1111)
g.

That there was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted

the testimony given by the plaintiff, regarding the parties interest, and therefore the court
finds as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt Lake to be
marital property, awarded to the plaintiff in the subject Decree of Divorce. (Findings of
Fact, 1112).
h.

That by virtue of the foregoing the defendant did not negotiate

in good faith when she agreed that the plaintiff would be entitled to the 3.1 acres and the
3.47 acres in the North Salt lake, as of the time of filing of the complaint for divorce, when
she had already transferred the said parcels in April of 1991. (Findings of Fact, 1114).
i.

That the defendant agreed to transfer the parties interest in the

said two parcels as existed in July, 1990, without disclosing to the plaintiff, his counsel,
defendant counsel nor the Court that she had already transferred all of the parties interest
two months earlier, to defendant's mother and sister in violation of the restraining order that
she sought and obtained from the court, in August of 1990. (Findings of Fact, 1115).
j.

That the negotiations by the defendant were therefore not only

in bad faith, but that the transfer of the subject property to be in direct violation of the
restraining order obtained by the defendant. (Findings of Fact, 1116).
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k.

That the fair market value of the two parcels of property, of 3.1

acres and 3.47 acres to be $105,200.00. (Findings of Fact, 1117).
1.

That the pawning of the shot guns and the transfer of the two

parcels of property to be in direct violation of the restraining order of this Court, and
therefore the plaintiff is entitled to judgment of $106,200.00 as well as a reasonable
attorneys fee. (Findings of Fact, 1118).
9.

Based on those Findings, the Court granted the plaintiff judgment in

the amount of $106,200.00, costs in the sum of $769.75 and a reasonable attorneys fee of
$5,150.00, all to bear interest at the maximum legal rate until paid.
10.

The defendant objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, particularly paragraph 2 as not accurately setting forth the terms of the
Decree of Divorce regarding the parties' real property; and the statement of paragraph 12
of the Findings of Fact that there was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the
testimony given by the plaintiff regarding the parties' interest in the real property. The
Court denied the defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
which were entered by the Court on March 29, 1996.
11.

The defendant marshals the following evidence that would support the

Findings of Fact that are challenged in this appeal:
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a.

The testimony of the plaintiff that prior to the time the parties

appeared before the court for the hearing on the divorce, July 2, 1991, the defendant owned
the 3.1 acre parcel (TT, p. 53, 11. 23-25).
b.

That the plaintiff testified that the basis of his ownership in the

3.1 acres was that in 1983 and 1984 Perry Vincent was having problems with the IRS, that
the IRS was going to take Perry Vincent's home and that he and Perry Vincent negotiated
a project in Wyoming and that David Costanzo gave Perry Vincent $13,000.00 when the job
was over (TT p. 54,11. 1-19).
c.

That the plaintiff testified that as a result of the aforementioned

payments, the property was really paid one-half by himself and one-half by Perry Vincent
(TT p. 54, 11. 23-25, p. 55, 1. 1).
d.

That the plaintiff testified that when he and Perry Vincent split

in February or March of 1983, he reached an arrangement by which he and the defendant
would pay for the 3.47 acres and that Perry Vincent and his wife, Diane Vincent, would be
responsible for the payments on the 10.7 acres (TT p. 61, 11. 11-25).
e.

That the plaintiff testified that he owned both parcels of real

property even though his name did not appear on any of the Deeds (TT p. 78, 11. 11-15).
f.

That the plaintiff testified that as far as the subject properties

were concerned, the ownership was not reflected by the names appearing on the respective
Deeds (TT p. 80, 11. 9-17).
8

g.

That the plaintiff testified that the 3.1 acres was deeded to him

through the defendant (TT p. 116, 11. 24-25).
h.

That he had an arrangement with Perry Vincent that if Perry

would pay for a parcel of 10.7 acres, the plaintiff would pay for the 3.47 acres (TT p. 125,
11. 22-25).
1

That the plaintiff testified that he owned 100% of the 3.1 acres

"because there was a lot of time that Shauna and I gave money to Perry." (TT p. 126,11. 2125).
j.

That the plaintiff testified that the 3.1 acres was a set-off against

what he contributed to Perry Vincent's judgments. (TT p. 127, 11. 15-19).
k.

That under cross-examination the defendant testified that

paragraph 7 of the Answer and Counterclaim states that "during the marriage the parties
acquired an interest in real property located in North Salt Lake. Plaintiff should be
awarded the entire interest subject to paying defendant one-half of the value of said interest,
which is to take place no later than 30 days following the entry of the Decree of Divorce."
(TT p. 141, 11. 23-25, p. 142, 11. 1-5).
1.

That in the Financial Declaration the defendant requested that

"plaintiff should be awarded real property located in North Salt Lake, Utah subject to the
plaintiff paying defendant one-half the value of said interest, which is to take place no later
than two or three days following the entry of the Decree of Divorce." (TT p. 143,11. 11-16).
9

12.

That the following evidence supports the arguments made in this

appeal:
a.

The defendant's testimony that she did not remember how or

when the two pieces of real property were acquired (TT p. 28, 11. 6-12).
b.

The defendant's testimony that her understanding was that the

two parcels were purchased by her father, Perry Vincent, and that he had asked her to "sign
with my mom on the property." (TT p. 28, 1. 17).
c.

The defendant's testimony that in April of 1991 when the

defendant transferred her interest in the properties, she had done so at the instruction of
her father, and that she did not receive any money related to the transfer. (TT p. 38,11. 1822).
d.

The defendant's testimony that she did not pay any consideration

regarding either of the properties. (TT p. 43, 1. 4).
e.

The defendant's testimony that she never discussed with anyone

what was going to be done with the properties, and wasn't involved in selling and/or
transferring the properties (TT p. 48-49, 11. 18-19).
f.

The plaintiffs testimony that the 3.1 acres were purchased when

Perry Vincent returned from Kentucky (TT p. 51, 11. 24, 25; p. 52, 11. 15-23).
g.

The plaintiffs testimony that Perry Vincent negotiated with the

seller for the purchase of the 3.1 acre property (TT p. 52, 11. 22, 23).
10

h.

The plaintiffs testimony that Perry Vincent paid the down

payment on the 3.1 acre property (TT p. 53; 11. 1, 2).
i.

The plaintiffs testimony that the balance of the payments for

the purchase of the 3.1 acre property was made from Perry Vincent and his sand-blasting
company (TT p. 53, 11. 16-20).
j.

The plaintiffs testimony that as a result of the payments made

by the sand-blasting company, the payments on the 3.1 acre property were made one-half
by Perry Vincent, and one-half by the plaintiff (TT p. 54, 11. 23-25; p. 55, 1. 1).
k.

The plaintiffs testimony that Shauna Costanzo did not

participate in transactions regarding the property (TT p. 56, 11. 15-17).
1.

The plaintiffs testimony that the defendant did not know what

property she had; that she was not kept abreast of the status of the properties; and that in
July of 1991 when the parties reached their agreement, the defendant did not know what
interest she had in the subject pieces of real property (TT p. 57, 11. 5-19).
m.

The plaintiffs testimony regarding the 3.47 acres that the

defendant and her mother had signed the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the Warranty
Deed on behalf of the defendant and Perry Vincent (TT p. 59, 11. 12-14).
n.

The plaintiffs testimony that a corporation, the name of which

he could not recall, tendered the down payment on the 3.47 acre property (TT p. 15,11. 1224).
11

o.

The plaintiffs testimony that the reason neither of the properties

had been put in his and Perry Vincent's names was to protect Perry Vincent (TT p. 62, 11.
3,4).
p.

The plaintiffs testimony that Perry Vincent had paid the taxes

on the 3.1 acre property (TT p. 65, 11. 7-9).
q.

The plaintiffs testimony that he and Perry Vincent were "he

incorporators of Interwest Sandblasting (TT p. 54, 11. 17, 18).
r.

The plaintiffs testimony that his name did not appear on any

s.

The plaintiffs testimony regarding the 3.1 acres:

of the deeds.

(1)

That it was purchased on July 17, 1977 (TT p. 81,11. 13-

(2)

That the purchase price was $12,400 (TT p. 82, 1. 3).

(3)

That the down payment was $5,500, and was paid by Perry

(4)

That the Uniform Real Estate Contract that had been

14).

Vincent (TT p. 82, 11. 6-9).

entered into by the defendant and her mother on July 26, 1977 provided that when the
buyers had tendered all of the payments set forth in the Uniform Real Estate Contract, the
sellers would provide a Warranty Deed (TT p. 83, 11. 13-18; p. 84, 11. 5-6).

12

(5)

That the Warranty Deed transferring the property to the

defendant and Diane Vincent, each with a one-half undivided interest, was executed on
December 26, 1977 and recorded with the Davis County Recorder on January 9, 1978 (TT
p. 86, 11. 9-18).
t.

That the 3.47 acre property was purchased in 1978 (TT p. 88,

u.

That Perry Vincent had an interest in the properties even though

11. 18, 19).

neither were in his name, but were in his wife's and the defendant's names (TT p. 98,11. 1521).
v.

That in February of 1983, the plaintiff started a company known

as "Western States Coating and Painting" and he needed equipment for that business (TT
p. 104, 11. 8-16).
w.

That prior to starting out the business was first called Interwest

Coating and Painting (TT p. 104, 11. 22-23).
x.

That the plaintiff negotiated with Perry Vincent for some

equipment (TT p. 105, 11. 17-25).
y.

That as part of his negotiation with Perry Vincent, the plaintiff

was going to pay the sellers on the 3.47 acres (TT 106, 11. 1-5).
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z.

That the sellers of the 3.47 acres, the Larsens, issued a Warranty

Deed to the defendant and her mother on December 11, 1979, which was recorded on
December 14, 1979 (TT p. 110, 11. 5-7 and 22-24).
aa.

That during the time the plaintiff was in business with Perry

Vincent, he and Perry were "pretty much partners, half and half." (TT p. 125,11. 13-17).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
POINT 1. THE FINDING THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDED
THE TWO SUBJECT PARCELS OF PROPERTY TO THE PLAINTIFF IS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Summary: One of the issues between the parties was whether there was a marital
or individual interest in the subject properties, the plaintiff claiming there was an interest
and the defendant claiming there was no interest. This issue was resolved by the parties
stipulating that whatever interest the parties, or the defendant individually, had in the said
properties as of July of 1990 would be awarded to the plaintiff. The stipulation of July 2,
1991 as clarified by the plaintiffs counsel states: "Consistent with this agreement that the
plaintiff would be awarded any marital or individual interest in the properties, // any!'
(emphasis added).
POINT 2. THE COURTS FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Summary: The consistent testimony from both the plaintiff and the defendant was
that from the date the properties were purchased, continuing through the date the parties
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appeared before the court for the divorce trial, the defendant did not participate in any way
in the purchase, maintenance, or disposition of the properties; did not know what interest
she had or did not have; and was acting on behalf of others. As such, the defendant could
not have negotiated in bad faith regarding those properties.
POINT 3. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF.
Summary: The award of attorney's fees was predicated on the court's finding that the
defendant had acted in bad faith in the negotiations regarding the properties. As even the
plaintiff claims that the defendant was not aware of what interest she had in those
properties, and was acting on behalf of others, she could not have been negotiating in bad
faith.

As the defendant could not have been negotiating in bad faith, the award of

attorney's fees was improper.
POINT 4. THE FINDING THAT THERE IS NO TESTIMONY OR
OTHER EVIDENCE THAT CONTRADICTED THE TESTIMONY
GIVEN BY THE PLAINTIFF REGARDING THE PARTIES' INTEREST
IN THE 3.1 AND 3.47 ACRE PROPERTIES" IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Summary: For the finding to be correct, there must not have been any testimony or
other evidence contradicting the plaintiffs testimony that he owned the 3.1 and 3.47 acres.
The record is replete with testimony and documentary evidence contradicting the plaintiffs
claim of ownership. Contradictory to the plaintiffs claim that he owned both properties
outright is his own testimony that Perry Vincent paid the down payment on the 3.1 acre
property; that at no time did he receive a deed or title to the properties; that corporate
15

entities, not the plaintiff personally, made payments on the other properties; that corporate
entities operated by he and Perry Vincent paid for the properties; that Perry Vincent paid
for the properties; that he and Perry Vincent paid for the properties "50-50;" that the
Uniform Real Estate Contract provided that the Deed to the 3.1 acre property would be
conveyed when paid; and that the Warranty Deed was issued in December of 1977.
POINT 5. THE COURTS FINDING THAT THERE WAS A MARITAL
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS.
Summary: There was conflicting and contrary evidence presented at trial regarding
ownership of the subject properties. The Warranty Deed on the 3.1 acre property was
executed on December 26, 1977 pursuant to which the defendant and Diane Vincent each
received a one-half undivided interest in said property. The Warranty Deed on the 3.47
acre property was conveyed to the defendant and Diane Vincent as joint tenants, not tenants
in common, with full rights of survivorship, on December 11, 1979. There was no evidence
supporting the court's finding that there was a marital interest in said properties. Said
findings might have included (a) whether and/or when these properties were conveyed the
defendant and/or her mother obtained an interest, and if so, their respective ownership
interests; (b) whether the court determined that at the time the properties were conveyed,
that the plaintiff had an interest and if so, what interest; (c) whether at the time the
properties were conveyed the defendant and/or her mother were acting on behalf of others;
(d) if the plaintiff obtained an interest after the properties had been conveyed, what that
16

interest was and how it was obtained by him, and whether the interest was obtained by gift
or through the payments that the plaintiff claimed he made; and (e) why, if as the plaintiff
testified, he paid for one-half of the properties, the court granted judgment in an amount
equal to the entire value of the properties.
As there were no findings explaining how or why the parties acquired a marital
interest, the bare finding that there was a maiital interest is not sufficiently supported.
POINT 6. THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING
THE PLAINTIFF'S PETITION TO MODIFY.
Summary: The ruling from which this appeal is taken is the court's ruling on the
plaintiffs Verified Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. As the plaintiff did not allege
a change in circumstance; as the plaintiff did not even try to set forth a change in
circumstance at the trial; and as the court did not find a substantial change in circumstance,
it was error to grant the plaintiffs Petition to Modify.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE FINDING THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDED
THE TWO SUBJECT PARCELS OF PROPERTY TO THE PLAINTIFF IS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
On July 2, 1991, the parties appeared before the court for a hearing on the divorce.
After lengthy negotiations that took place that day, the parties reached a stipulation. That
stipulation was read into the record by defendant's counsel. Additions and clarifications to
the stipulation were made by plaintiffs counsel. One of the issues negotiated by the parties
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was whether the parties had an interest in two parcels of real property located in North Salt
Lake, one of which consisted of 3.1 acres, and the other which consisted of 3.47 acres. It
was the defendant's position that she did not have either an individual or marital interest
in those properties, and that although the 3.1 acre parcel had been conveyed to her and her
mother, Diane R. Vincent, each with a one-half undivided interest, in December of 1987,
and that by way of Warranty Deed dated December 11, 1979, she and her mother as joint
tenants, not as tenants in common with full rights of survivorship, received a Warranty Deed
on the 3.47 acre parcel, that the true owner of both parcels was her father, Perry Vincent,
and that her name appeared on the deeds only to protect her father.
The parties chose to resolve the issue of whether the defendant had an interest in
the properties by agreeing that whatever interest the defendant did have in the two parcels
as of the date the plaintiff had filed for divorce, July 6, 1990, would be awarded to the
plaintiff. Consistent with this resolution, in reference to the two parcels paragraph 12 of the
Decree of Divorce provided "[specifically, plaintiff is awarded all of the joint interest in the
said parcels as well as any individual interest of the defendant in the same as of July 1,
1991." The defendant recognizes her obligation to marshall all evidence that would support
the trial court's finding that the plaintiff was simply awarded the two parcels of real
property. There is no evidence that supports that finding. Evidence in addition to the
Decree supports the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was awarded whatever interest
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the defendant had in the subject properties. The evidence is the stipulation that was read
into the record on the issue of the two parcels. The defendant's counsel stated:
There was some other property which, of course, the defendant has
claimed was not marital property. It is our agreement that should it be
determined that there is a marital interest in the property other than the 10.7
acres and the residential property that it would go completely to the plaintiff
free and clear of any interest of the defendant. (TT, July 2, 1991; p. 2; 11. 24,
25; p. 3; 11. 1-5).
The plaintiffs counsel was provided an opportunity to make any clarifications or
additions to the stipulation regarding the same two parcels of real property. The plaintiffs
counsel stated:
There are, in our view, Judge, two pieces of property, and I want to be
clear on this one point; two pieces of property in addition to the 10.7 acres
in North Salt Lake and the marital residence which my client claims there is
an interest either in himself, the two of them, or in the defendant by herself;
and it's the agreement between the parties that whatever interest she may
have in reference to both the individual capacity or as a marital estate would
be conveyed to my client, if any. (TT, July 2, 1991; p. 4, 1. 25; p. 5, 11. 1-9).
The evidence demonstrates that the parties had stipulated and the court had ordered
that the plaintiff would be awarded whatever interest the defendant had as of July 1, 1990 not that the plaintiff was specifically awarded the two parcels of real property. Findings of
Fact #2 that states that the plaintiff was awarded the two parcels of property is clearly
erroneous.
POINT 2. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the court's findings state, respectively, that:
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That the defendant agreed to transfer the parties interest in the said
two parcels as existed in July, 1990, without disclosing to the plaintiff, his
counsel, defendant counsel nor the Court that she had already transferred all
of the parties interest two months earlier, to defendant's mother and sister in
violation of the restraining order that she sought and obtained from the court,
in August of 1990. (Findings of Fact, 1115).
That the negotiations by the defendant were therefore not only in bad
faith, but that the transfer of the subject property to be in direct violation of
the restraining order obtained by the defendant. (Findings of Fact, 1116).
The defendant does not dispute that she transferred whatever interest she had in said
properties subsequent to the entry of the restraining order and prior to the time the parties
appeared before the court on July 2, 1991. The defendant does take issue with the finding
that she negotiated in bad faith. The defendant testified at the trial that the properties had
been titled in her name and in the name of her mother at the instruction of her father; that
she was not involved in any way in the purchase of the two properties; and that until the
time that the two properties were transferred, she did not in any way take any actions
consistent with an ownership interest in either of the properties. The evidence was that the
defendant did not pay any consideration to obtain an interest in either properties, nor did
she receive any consideration when the two properties were transferred. The defendant
testified that during the time she and her mother both held undivided one-half interests in
the 3.1 acre property, and the time that her mother and she were joint tenants, not tenants
in common with full rights of survivorship in the 3.47 acre property, that she did not make
any payments related to the purchase or maintenance of the two properties.
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The plaintiffs testimony on this subject was consistent with the defendant's. The
plaintiff testified that regarding the 3.1 acre property, Perry Vincent, the defendant's father,
negotiated for the purchase of the real property; that Perry Vincent paid the down payment;
and that the balance of the payments were made by a sand-blasting company. The following
series of questions and answers between the plaintiff and his counsel provides direct support
that the defendant was not aware of the status of the subject properties at any time after
their purchase, including when the parties were negotiating on July 2, 1991.
Question:

I want you to focus on my question in reference to the language
found in open court. Do you recall there being a time when
Shauna didn't know what was there and so we phrased it in
those terms?

Answer:

Sure.

Question:

So we phrased it in those terms?

Answer:

Sure.

Question:

Tell the court about that quickly, please.

Answer:

Well, you know, she was busy doing other things and she didn't really - I know we didn't really keep her abreast of any of it. We sat her
down and said we want you together on the title. Here's a check. And
we gave them a check, and that's it.

Question:

So Shauna wasn't abreast of things. So when it comes time to
negotiate this parcel and what, if any interest - "if any" why are saying
"if any" in the stipulation and in the agreement process, Mr. Costanzo.

Answer:

Because I don't think she knew what she had.

(IT, p. 57, 11. 5-19).
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The plaintiff argued to the court and the court did find that as the defendant had
referenced in her Counterclaim and in her Financial Declaration the property in North Salt
Lake, that she was aware of the status of the 3.1 and 3.47 acre parcels. The difficulty with
this argument, and with that finding, is that the parties did own other property in North Salt
Lake consisting of 10.7 acres. The defendant and the plaintiff have always agreed that there
was a marital interest in the 10.7 acres. There was no evidence that the defendant had
acknowledged in any way that there was a marital interest in the 3.1 and 3.47 acres. The
evidence that was offered by the defendant and the plaintiff is consistent that the defendant
was not involved in the purchase, maintenance, and disposition of the 3.1 and 3.47 acres.
The defendant could not have negotiated in bad faith regarding the property if she did not
know what interest she may have had. Even the plaintiff testified that the defendant was
not aware of the status of the properties; that those issues were kept from her; and that she
had been acting on behalf of others, including the plaintiff. The fact that the defendant did
not know what interest she had in the real property prevents a finding of bad faith.
POINT 3. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF.
The plaintiff recognizes the general rule that "an award of attorney's fees is
appropriate only if authorized by statute or contract." Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188
(Utah 1993) at 198. In the instant case, the court found that the defendant had negotiated
in bad faith. The defendant further recognizes that under §78-27-56 Utah Code Ann., the
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court was authorized to award attorney's fees to the plaintiff based on its finding that the
defendant had negotiated in bad faith. As was argued above, the court's finding that the
defendant had acted in bad faith was based on the erroneous determination that the
defendant knew what interest she had in the subject properties. The plaintiff testified that
the defendant had no knowledge of the status of the properties, and was acting on behalf
of others, and was in fact not kept abreast of the status of the property. As the finding that
the defendant was acting in bad faith is erroneous, the award of attorney's fees which
appears to be based on bad faith becomes improper.
POINT 4. THE FINDING THAT "THERE IS NO TESTIMONY OR OTHER
EVIDENCE THAT CONTRADICTED THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE
PLAINTIFF REGARDING THE PARTIES' INTEREST IN THE 3.1 AND 3.47
ACRE PROPERTIES" IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact states that:
There was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the
testimony given by the plaintiff, regarding the parties' interest, and therefore
the Court finds as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in
North Salt Lake to be marital property awarded to the plaintiff in the subject
Decree of Divorce. (Findings of Fact, 1112).
Regarding the 3.1 acre parcel, the plaintiff testified that (a) at the time the parties
entered into the stipulation, he believed he owned the 3.1 acre parcel (TT, p. 53,11. 23-25);
(b) and that by virtue of money and help on a construction project that he provided to Perry
Vincent, he "in essence" gave Perry Vincent twelve or thirteen thousand dollars by which he
acquired an ownership interest in the property.
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The plaintiff also offered the following testimony which contradicts the statements
set forth above:
1.

That on July 26, 1977, Diane R. Vincent and Shauna V. Costanzo

designated as buyers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Richard and
Frances Chamberlain (TT, p. 81, 11. 3-14).
2.

That the down payment of $5,500 was paid by Perry Vincent (TT, p.

3.

That paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract provided that

82,11. 6-9).

title to the property would be given to the buyers when they had complied with the payment
provisions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
4.

That a Warranty Deed conveying to Diane R. Vincent and Shauna V.

Costanzo, each with a one-half undivided interest in the 3.1 acres, was signed by the sellers
on December 26, 1977, and recorded with the Davis County Recorder on January 9, 1978.
5.

That the plaintiffs and Perry Vincent's sand-blasting company paid the

balance owing after the down payment (TT, p. 53, 11. 16-20).
6.

That as a result of plaintiff making payments to Perry Vincent

regarding a Wyoming property, the purchase price was paid one-half by himself, and onehalf by Perry Vincent (TT, p. 54, 11. 23-25; p. 55, 1 1.).
The court based its finding of a marital interest in the 3.1 acre property on the
uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff. This finding ignores the fact that the plaintiff
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contradicted his own testimony. The plaintiff testified that by virtue of payments that he
made, and despite the fact that his name does not and never did appear on the title, that
he owned that property. The problem from a consistency standpoint is that the plaintiff
admitted that Perry Vincent paid the down payment; and that a company he and Perry
Vincent had incorporated had really made payments for the rest of the property.
The plaintiffs testimony is also contradicted by his testimony regarding the Uniform
Real Estate Contract and the Warranty Deed. The plaintiff testified that the Uniform Real
Estate Contract entered into on July 26, 1977 provided that a Deed would be given to the
purchasers when the buyer had tendered all payments pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate
Contract. The plaintiff testified that the Warranty Deed was executed by the sellers on
December 26, 1977 and recorded on January 9, 1978.
Regarding the 3.47 acres, the plaintiff testified that in February of 1983, he started
a company known as "Western States Coating and Painting" and that he needed equipment
for that business (TT. p. 104, 11. 8-16); that prior to starting, the business was first called
"Interwest Coating and Painting" (TT p. 104, 11. 22, 23); that he negotiated with Perry
Vincent for some equipment (TT p. 105,11. 17-25); that as part of his negotiation with Perry
Vincent, he was going to pay the sellers on the 3.47 property (TT p. 106, 11. 1-5); that a
Warranty Deed issued from the sellers to Diane Vincent and Shauna V. Costanzo on
December 11, 1979 and was recorded on December 14, 1979 (TT p. 110, 11. 5-24). The
plaintiff provided contradictory testimony on whether the property had been paid for on
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December 11, 1979, stating first that the Warranty Deed was "registered" when the property
was paid for (TT p. 109, 11. 16-18). As to the plaintiffs claim that he owned the property
because he had paid for it, the plaintiff also testified that corporate entities, not the plaintiff
personally, had made payments on the property.
The court found that there was a marital interest in the property based on the
uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff. Yet there were the following inconsistencies:
1.

No interest in either of these properties was conveyed to the plaintiff.

2.

The Warranty Deed to the 3.1 acre parcel which was to be conveyed

when the buyers had fully performed, was conveyed in December of 1977, is contrary to the
testimony that an arrangement was reached in 1983 between himself and Perry Vincent as
to payment for the property, and that a company in which he and Perry were involved in
had made other payments on the property.
3.

The plaintiffs claim that he owned 100% interest in both parties by

virtue of payments that he made is contradicted by statements the plaintiff made that
corporate entities in which he was involved with and without Perry Vincent made payments
on the properties.
These inconsistencies in the evidence make the court's finding that the plaintiffs
evidence was uncontradicted clearly erroneous.
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POINT 5. THE COURTS FINDING THAT THERE WAS A MARITAL
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS.
As was set forth above, the court found that:
There was no testimony or other evidence that contradicted the
testimony given by the plaintiff regarding the parties' interest, and therefore
the court finds as a matter of law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in
North Salt Lake to be marital property awarded to the plaintiff in the subject
Decree of Divorce. (Findings of Fact, 1112).
This finding, by itself, without other supporting findings, is insufficient. In Butler,
Crockett & Walsh v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995), the court held:
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is
reversible error unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." The findings
of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree "follows logically from,
and is supported by, the evidence." The findings "should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Id. at 23.
As was argued above, the plaintiff testified in a contradictory manner regarding his
claim of ownership, and that there was documentary evidence that contradicted the
defendant's testimony. These contradictions and conflicts prohibit the claim that clearly
established and uncontroverted facts could only support the judgment.
The findings do not provide any detail, and do not disclose any of the steps upon
which the court reached the ultimate factual determination that there was a marital interest
in the real property. Such subsidiary facts might include (a) whether the court found that
there was a marital interest when the properties were purchased, and if not, when the
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marital interest was acquired; (b) whether the court found that Diane Vincent did not have
an interest, or if she did have an interest, when and how that interest was lost; (c) whether
Perry Vincent had an interest and if so, when it was lost; (d) how was a marital interest
acquired; was the marital interest acquired through Shauna Costanzo, or was it through
David Costanzo; (e) were Diane Vincent and Shauna Costanzo merely holding the
properties in a constructive trust on behalf of their husbands, or on behalf of David
Costanzo; (f) if David Costanzo acquired an ownership interest by virtue of payments he
made, what are the facts that led the court to grant judgment based on the finding that the
plaintiff had completely owned both of the subject properties; (g) how the marital interest
was acquired - was it by way of gift through the defendant's father or mother, or was it by
virtue of payments that the plaintiff made; (h) if the court accepts the testimony of plaintiff
that ownership of the properties was established through the payments he made, a finding
as to why ownership interest was not acquired by the corporate entities rather than David
Costanzo personally; (i) a finding as to how the court determined that the defendant should
have judgment for the entirety of both properties, if, as the plaintiff testified, that by virtue
of payments he made, he had made one-half of the payments for the properties.
As there are no findings explaining how or why the court reached the ultimate factual
determination that there was a marital interest, the court's finding by itself is insufficient.
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POINT 6. THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE
PLAINTIFFS PETITION TO MODIFY.
The long-time standard is that "to obtain a modification of a divorce decree, the
movant must show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, that was
not originally contemplated within the decree itself." Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah
App. 1989) at 1251. In the instant case, the plaintiff did not allege that there had been a
change in circumstances. There was no evidence presented at the trial that would support
a finding of a change in circumstance. Consistently, there was no finding that could arguably
be interpreted as a determination of a change of circumstances since the entry of the
Decree. As there was no claim that there had been a change in circumstances; as there had
been no evidence presented that would support a claim for a change in circumstances; and
as there was no finding that suggests a change in circumstance, the court's granting of the
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
As the plaintiff did not allege, attempt to prove, or establish a change in
circumstance; and in that the court did not find a change in circumstance, the court's
judgment granting the plaintiffs Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce should be reversed.
Should the court find that the plaintiff did prove a change in circumstances sufficient for the
lower court to grant the plaintiffs Petition to Modify, the defendant respectfully requests
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that the court find that the defendant has attacked clearly erroneous findings that are not
supported by the evidence and reverse the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 16th day of December, 1996.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Harry Caston
^.ttopleys for Appellant/Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of December, 1996, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
John Walsh
2319 Foothill Drive, #270
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
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that the court find that the defendant has attacked clearly erroneous findings that are not
supported by the evidence and reverse the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 16th day of December, 1996.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Harry (/aston
Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of December, 1996, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
John Walsh
2319 Foothill Drive, #270
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID

CASTANZO,
PLAINTIFF,
NO. 904902675DA

V.
SHAUNA

COSTANZO,
DEFENDANT.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ROKICH, JUDGE
JULY 2, 1991
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
3865 SOUTH WASATCH BOULEVARD
SUITE 202, COVE POINT PLAZA
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84109

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

HARRY CASTON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1200 KENNECOTT BUILDING
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE STEET
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84133

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY, 2, 1991
P R O C E E D I N G S
*

* *

(CONTINUING)
THE COURT:

OKAY.

PROCEED WITH YOUR

STIPULATION, THEN.
MR. CASTON:

YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE WE GOT A

STIPULATION AND I WILL STATE IT AS FULLY AS I CAN.

I'M

SURE MR. WALSH MAY HAVE SOME CORRECTIONS OR ADDITIONS.
THE DEFENDANT WILL WITHDRAW HER ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM AND ALLOW THE COURT TO ENTER A DIVORCE
BASED ON THE TERMS OF OUR STIPULATION.
THE DEFENDANT-- THE PLAINTIFF WOULD PAY TO
THE DEFENDANT THE SUM OF $35,000 PAYABLE $588 MONTH FOR
A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS, STARTING AUGUST 1ST, 1991.
$300 A MONTH ALIMONY WHICH IS PERMANENT
UNLESS, OF COURSE, THE DEFENDANT WERE TO REMARRY,
COHABITATE OR DISEASE THE PLAINTIFF.
CHILD SUPPORT WILL BE BASED ON $3500 A MONTH
AND $1600 A MONTH.
THE DEFENDANT WOULD RECEIVE FREE AND CLEAR OF
ANY INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFF 10.7 ACRES, APPROXIMATELY
TEN ACRES, OF PROPERTY IN NORTH SALT LAKE.

THERE'S

$2300 OF AN OBLIGATION TO MERRILL R. NORMAN WHO
PERFORMED AN APPRAISAL IN THIS CASE.

THAT WOULD BE
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BORNE BY MY CLIENT, THE DEFENDANT.
THE PLAINTIFF WILL PAY THE BALANCE OF MY
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
GUARANTEE THAT.

HE HAS INDICATED HE WILL

PERSONALLY

I WILL SUPPLY THE PLAINTIFF WITH AN

AFFIDAVIT AS TO THE TRUENESS AND CORRECTNESS OF WHAT
LEGAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED, AS WELL AS THE
MONTHLY BILLING STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD GIVE PROOF AS TO
WHAT HAS BEEN PAID ON THE ATTORNEY'S FEES.
ON PERSONAL PROPERTY THE PARTIES WOULD BE
AWARDED THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THEIR

POSSESSION,

THEIR CLOTHES AND PERSONAL EFFECTS WITH THE FOLLOWING
EXCEPTION.
THE PLAINTIFF WOULD BE AWARDED THE BEDROOM
SET AND A GRANDMOTHER CLOCK FOR A PROPERTY OF EQUAL
VALUE, AND THE EXCEPTION ON THE BEDROOM SET IS THAT MY
CLIENT MAY RETAIN THE MATTRESS AND BOX SPRINGS.
THE PLAINTIFF WILL BE AWARDED THE REAL
PROPERTY—

THE BUSINESS KNOWN AS WESTERN

COATINGS AND PAINTING.

STATES

THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO

THAT.
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S FATHER AND THE PLAINTIFF
WILL REMOVE ANY TIRES THAT ARE PRESENTLY ON THE
•POINT-SOME-ODD ACRES IN NORTH SALT LAKE.
THERE WAS SOME OTHER PROPERTY WHICH, OF
)URSE, THE DEFENDANT HAS CLAIMED WAS NOT MARITAL
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PROPERTY.

IT IS OUR AGREEMENT THAT SHOULD IT BE

DETERMINED THAT THERE IS A MARITAL INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY OTHER THAN THE 10.7 ACRES AND THE RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTY THAT IT WOULD GO COMPLETELY TO THE PLAINTIFF
FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY INTEREST OF THE DEFENDANT./
THE PLAINTIFF WOULD BE AWARDED

WHATEVER

VEHICLE HE'S DRIVING OR ANY VEHICLE HE HAS.
THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE AWARDED
AND HER VEHICLE.

HER JEWELRY

THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT THE

DEFENDANT WOULD BE AWARDED THE SOLE CUSTODY OF THE
PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN; THAT MY CLIENT IS FIT AND
PROPER TO BE AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN.

WE HAVE

AGREED TO USE THE VISITATION SCHEDULE THAT HAS BEEN
CIRCULATED BY THE COMMISSIONERS, AND WHICH I BELIEVE
THE COURT MAY HAVE MADE REFERENCE TO EARLIER IN COUNSEL
DISCUSSIONS.
THE COURT:

I DID.

MR. CASTON:

THE D E F E N D A N T —

WILL OBTAIN LIFE INSURANCE

THE PLAINTIFF

IN AN AMOUNT TO PAY THE

BALANCE OF CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD HE DISEASE.
THE PARTIES WILL MAINTAIN

IN EFFECT ANY

HEALTH, MEDICAL, DENTAL, ACCIDENT INSURANCE THEY HAVE
ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN.

THE PARTIES

TO SPLIT THE COST OF ANY UNCOVERED DENTAL, ORTHODONTIC,
OR MEDICAL EXPENSES.
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HAVE I LEFT ANYTHING OUT?
THE COURT:

MR. WALSH, DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING

TO ADD TO THE STIPULATION?
MR. WALSH:

JUDGEI LET ME MAKE A CLARIFICATION

OR TWO, AND THEN I NEED TO TALK AND MAKE SURE WE'RE IN
AGREEMENT ON A MATTER.
THE HOUSE OF THE PARTIES LOCATED AT 1141
NORTH CAPISTRANO DRIVE HERE IN SALT LAKE WILL BE
AWARDED COMPLETELY TO THE DEFENDANT HEREIN, ALL RIGHTS,
TITLE AND INTEREST IN THAT REGARD.

THERE IS A MORTGAGE

ON THAT PIECE OF PROPERTY WHICH MY CLIENT IS LIABLE
FOR.

THE PARTIES ARE AGREEABLE THAT IF AT ANY TIME THE

DEFENDANT EVER GETS MORE THAN 30 DAYS BEHIND ON THAT,
OR ANY OTHER PAYMENT FOR WHICH HE IS INDIVIDUALLY OR
JOINTLY LIABLE STEMMING FROM THIS DIVORCE, HE CAN PAY
THAT AND SUBTRACT THAT FROM THE CHILD SUPPORT OR
ALIMONY FOR THE MONTH WHICH HE MAKES THE PAYMENT.
MR. CASTON:
MR. WALSH:

THAT WAS OUR AGREEMENT.
THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY

WITH

REFERENCE TO THE-- WHEN WE SAY EQUAL VALUE, WE'RE NOT
TALKING EQUAL VALUE OF THE BED SET AND VALUE ONLY WITH
REFERENCE TO THE CLOCK ONLY.
MR. CASTON:
THE COURT:
| MR.
MR WALSH:

THAT IS CORRECT.
ALL RIGHT.
THERE ARE IN OUR VIEW, JUDGE, TWO
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PIECES OF PROPERTY, AND I WANT TO BE CLEAR ON THIS ONE
POINT; TWO PIECES OF PROPERTY IN ADDITION TO THE 10.7
ACRES IN NORTH SALT LAKE AND THE MARITAL

RESIDENCE

WHICH MY CLIENT CLAIMS THERE IS AN INTEREST EITHER IN
HIMSELF, THE TWO OF THEM, OR IN THE DEFENDANT BY
HERSELF; AND IT'S THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
THAT WHATEVER INTEREST SHE MAY HAVE IN REFERENCE TO
BOTH THE INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY OR AS A MARITAL

ESTATE

»rj

WOULD BE CONVEYED TO MY CLIENT, IF ANY
MR. CASTON:

AS EXISTED JULY 1ST, 1990.

MR. WALSH:

LAST YEAR, JUDGE, AT THE TIME OF

FILING THIS ACTION.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. WALSH:

ONE LAST THING, JUDGE, IF I

MIGHT.
YOUR HONOR, THERE PRESENTLY IS IN EFFECT AN
ORDER THAT ALLOWS MY CLIENT TO SEE THE CHILDREN EVERY
WEDNESDAY.

THE SCHEDULE THAT YOU HAVE HERE PROVIDES

EVERY OTHER WEDNESDAY.
THE COURT:

WHATEVER YOU AGREE UPON.

THAT'S

JUST A MINIMUM.
MR. WALSH:
EVERY

DO YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH

WEDNESDAY?
MR. CASTON:
MR. WALSH:

NO.
WE ASK THAT THE CHILDREN BE
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ALLOWED TO GO TO GRANDMA'S ON FREE DAYS INSTEAD OF
HAVING TO PAY A BABYSITTER.

HISTORICALLY THEY HAVE

BEEN DOING THAT.
MR. CASTON:

IF THEY CHOSE THAT, FOR SHAUNA

DOESN'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH NOT INCURRING THOSE
EXPENSES.

IT SEEMS LIKE THE CHILDREN DON'T SEEM TO

WANT TO GO.
MR. WALSH:

THERE'S ONE LAST THING WE

DISCUSSED IN CHAMBERS, IN REFERENCE TO RESOLVING THE
CHILD CUSTODY ISSUE WE ASKED FOR SOLE CUSTODY IN OUR
PLEADINGS.

JOINT CUSTODY HAS BEEN DISCUSSED, AND

BECAUSE OF CERTAIN FINDINGS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES, THE COURT HAS TAKEN A VIEW WE WOULD NOT ALLOW
EITHER JOINT CUSTODY OR CUSTODY TO MY CLIENT, THE
PLAINTIFF.

BUT IT HAS BEEN THE COURT'S POSITION THAT

IF AT ANY TIME, FOR SPURIOUS REASONS, THE DEFENDANT WHO
IS GRANTED CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, SHALL

INTERFERE

WITH VISITATION OF THE PLAINTIFF-- A COUPLE OF THE
FINDINGS, THAT BOTH PARTIES ARE FIT AND PROPER PARENTS
TO BE GRANTED CUSTODY-- THAT THIS COURT WOULD GRANT AN
IMMEDIATE SWITCH OF CUSTODY IF THAT EVER HAPPENED.
THE COURT:

I DON'T WANT THESE KIDS TO BE

USED AS A PAWN, SO IF THERE'S NOT A VALID, LEGITIMATE
REASON FOR NOT ALLOWING VISITATION, THEN, COME BACK
BEFORE ME AND I'LL CHANGE CUSTODY, BECAUSE YOU'RE BOTH
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FIT AND PROPER PEOPLE.
MR. CASTON:

AS THE COURT WILL RECALL, I

CERTAINLY ARGUED STRENUOUSLY THAT ANY BEHAVIOR
OCCURRED.

HAS

A PROBLEM THAT MY CLIENT TALKS ABOUT TO ME

IS THE FACT THAT THE CHILDREN ARE PICKED UP AT
DIFFERENT TIMES.
THE COURT:

I'LL TELL YOU, YOU HAVE ABOUT AN

HOUR LEEWAY ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

I KNOW YOU EACH HAVE

PLANS, BUT ALLOW YOURSELF AN HOUR.

YOU CAN'T MEASURE

VISITATION IN MINUTES AND SECONDS.

SO ALLOW YOURSELF

SOME LEEWAY AND GET ALONG.

AND I'M SURE AFTER THE

DIVORCE IS GRANTED THINGS WILL SMOOTH OUT.
MR. WALSH:

MY UNDERSTANDING, BASED ON THE

THINGS THAT I SAID IN CHAMBERS, WE COULD HAVE SUCH
LANGUAGE IN THE DECREE.
THE COURT:
KNOW.

PUT IT IN THE DECREE SO YOU BOTH

IF YOU DON'T GET THE-MR. CASTON:

I THINK MR. WALSH IS SAYING IT

WOULD BE AUTOMATIC.
THE COURT:

NO.

COME BACK HERE BEFORE ME SO

I CAN HAVE A HEARING.
MR. WALSH:

AND IF THE COURT FINDS IT

SPURIOUS-THE COURT:

YES, I CAN HAVE A HEARING.

I'M

NOT GOING TO GRANT IT AUTOMATICALLY.
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BUT REMEMBER IT WORKS BOTH WAYS.

I COULD

LIMIT THE VISITATION IF HE DOESN'T GET THE KIDS BACK IN
TIME OR KEEPS THEM LONGER.

BUT GIVE YOURSELF A LITTLE

LEEWAY.
MR. CASTON:

YOUR HONOR, WE WERE WORK ON THE

OTHER PROBLEMS, SO OBVIOUSLY THIS PORTION IS NOT AS
SMOQTH AS THE OVER MATTERS WHICH WE WORKED OUT, BUT
THERE'S A CONCERN THAT MY CLIENT HAS.
THERE WAS SPECIAL INCIDENT WHERE

SOMETHING

HAPPENED AND WITHOUT GOING INTO THAT AND HAVING THE
WHOLE THING BLOW UP, IT WOULD BE MY CLIENT'S
UNDERSTANDING THAT IS THERE IS ONE VISITATION OVER
WHICH MR. COSTANZO WAS AWAY ON VACATION, AND IF HE'S
AWAY ON VACATION, I DON'T THINK
THE COURT:
MR. CASTON:

VISITATION—

NO.
SHE SHOULD HAVE TO-- I THINK A

REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENT
WITH THE CHILDREN ON VISITATION.
THE COURT:

IF HE'S OUT OF TOWN, IF HE'S OUT

OF TOWN AND SAYS I'M GOING TO BE GOING TO CALIFORNIA,
SHE DOESN'T HAVE TO TAKE THE KIDS OVER THERE, DOESN'T
HAVE TO TURN THEM OVER A SOMEONE ELSE.
MR. CASTON:

WOULD THE APPROPRIATE

LANGUAGE

BE THAT HE MUST BE PRESENT DURING VISITATION?
THE COURT:

THAT HE'S AVAILABLE

DURING

8

VISITATION.

THAT'S ALL, THAT HE'S AVAILABLE.

MR. WALSH:

RIGHT.

AND I UNDERSTAND THAT,

JUDGE, AND I DON'T WANT TO SPLIT HAIRS BECAUSE I AGREE
THAT ONCE THIS GETS RESOLVED, HOPEFULLY THE PARTIES
WILL WORK OUT WHAT'S IN THE BEST INTEREST OF CHILDREN.
THERE'S THIS ONE CONCERN.

SOMETIMES HE GETS

HOME LATE AND PREFERS THAT CHILDREN GO TO GRANDMA'S,
HIS MOTHER, WHERE THEY GO ANYWAY.

THEY WILL STAY LATE

AT NIGHT, START FIRST THING IN THE MORNING.
THE COURT:

I DON'T SEE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT

JUST AS LONG AS HE'S NOT OUT OF STATE OR NOT GOING TO
BE THERE, AND JUST GIVE THE CHILDREN TO GRANDMA JUST
FOR THE SAKE OF MAKING HER COMPLY TO VISITATION.

WE

DON'T WANT TO BE PLAYING GAMES WITH EACH OTHER.
MR. WALSH:

NOW IN LIGHT OF ALL THAT HAS BEEN

SAID AND DONE, DO YOU WANT TO TAKE JURISDICTION AND
GROUNDS?
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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, AN OFFICIAL COURT
REPORTER FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY
THAT I REPORTED THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON JULY 2,
1991, AND THE TRANSCRIPT PAGES 1 THROUGH 9, INCLUSIVE
CONTAIN A TRUE AND CORRECT REPORTER'S PARTIAL
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS.

DATED THIS 25TH DAY OF MARCH, 1992.

sJs.R.
KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, SJS.R.
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

HARRY CASTON (4009)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID COSTANZO,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff

:

V.

:

Civil No. 904902675DA

SHAUNA COSTANZO,

:

Judge John R. Rokich

Defendant

:

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on
Tuesday, July 2, 1991, at the hour 9:30 a.m. before the Honorable
John R. Rokich, Third District Court Judge.

The plaintiff was

present in person and represented by his counsel, John Walsh.

The

defendant was present in person and represented her by counsel,
Harry Caston.

On March 25, 1992 the parties appeared before the

Court on the defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce.

The--Court, after

hearing the stipulation of the parties being read into the record,
and after taking testimony of the plaintiff, and having ruled on
the defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions

9f Law and Decree of Divorce, and after making and adopting its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and now being fully
advised in the premises, does hereby
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE:
1.

That the plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce

on the basis of irreconcilable differences and the same is to be
final upon entry.
2.

That the defendant is hereby awarded the care, custody

and control of the parties' minor children, subject to liberal and
meaningful visitation in the plaintiff including, but not limited
to:
Alternate
Weekends:

Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m.

Midweek:

Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.

Holiday:

(A)

Christmas - non-custodial parent to have
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and
continuing through 1/2 of the child7s total
Christmas school vacation.

(B)

Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1992, 94,
etc) ; Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6p.m.
until Sunday 6:00 p.m. Non-custodial parent
to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 95,
etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until
Sunday 6 p.m.

(C)

Other holidays - New Year's'Day, Martin Luther
King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July
4th, July 24th, and Labor Day. These are to
be alternated, with the non-custodial parent
to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the
holiday.

3
Holidays take precedence over the weekend
visitation and no changes should be made to
the regular rotation of the alternating
weekend schedule.
Fathers Day/
Mother/s Dav:

As appropriate, 6 p.m. the day before until 6
p.m. the day of.

Birthdays:

One evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during
the week of the child's birthday and the noncustodial parent's birthday.

Extended
Visitation:

Telephone:

(A)

Summer - 5 weeks continuous, with written
notice of dated provided to custodial
parent by May 1st. Custodial parent to
have alternate weekends, holiday, and
phone visitation.

(B)

Year-Round school - two 2 week periods,
with written notice of dates to custodial
parent at least 30 days prior to
visitation.
Custodial parent to have
holiday, and phone visitation.

(C)

Each parent shall be allowed two weeks
per year uninterrupted possession of the
children for purposes vacation, provided
the same does not interfere with holiday
visitation per above. Each parent shall
notify the other in writing of such two
week period at least 30 days in advance.

Reasonable, before 8 p.m.

The parties stipulate and agree that on every Friday the minor
children are to go to the home of Darlene Costanzo; however, the
wishes of the minor children are to be considered in reference to
this Friday visitation, further the plaintiff is to be available
during his visitation.
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3.

Should either party, for spurious reasons, interfere with

the said visitation, the Court shall, after hearing, switch custody
of the minor children or limit visitation, as the Court deems
appropriate.
4*

Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $302.00 per month per

child for a total child support obligation of $604.00 per month.
Upon the payment of the same, plaintiff is hereby awarded one of
the exemptions involving the minor children. Any premiums paid by
the

plaintiff

for

health,

accident, hospitalization,

dental,

orthodontic or eye care insurance shall be subtracted from the said
$604.00 stated above. Any health of dental care provided the minor
children, but not paid for by insurance, shall be borne equally by
the parties.
5.

Plaintiff shall maintain life insurance on his own life

in a sum equal to the total monthly child support for the minor
children until each reaches the age of eighteen years of age.
6.

Plaintiff shall pay one-half of any work related child

care costs, and the defendant shall submit her paystubs to the
plaintiff.
7.

Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $300.00 as and for alimony

to the defendant.

5
8.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded all of the parties' right,

title and interest in the business known as Western States Coating
& Painting, Inc., as his sole and separate property.
9.

Defendant is hereby awarded the parties' home at 1141

Capistrano Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the indebtedness
thereon, and to release, hold harmless and indemnify the plaintiff
for the same, and at any time should the defendant fall thirty (30)
days or more late in the payment of the same, the plaintiff at his
sole discretion may pay the same, and subtract the said monies from
his monthly child support and/or alimony aforesaid.
10.

Defendant is hereby awarded the 10.7 acres in North Salt

Lake, and the plaintiff is hereby awarded the other two parcels in
North Salt Lake.

Specifically plaintiff is awarded all of the

joint interest in the said parcels as well as any individual
interest of the defendant in the same as of July 1, 1991.
11.

Plaintiff and defendant's father shall jointly and

equally contribute to the removal of the tires on the said 10.7
acres.
12.

Plaintiff shall^ pay the sum of $35,000.00 to the

cfefendant at the rate of $583.00 per month with no interest. The
plaintiff^ personally guarantees the payment of the same.
payments may be made by Western States Coating & Painting.

The
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13.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the personal property in his

possession as well as any clothing or personal effects and gifts as
well as the complete bedroom set, including: black lacquer queen
head board, black lacquer seven drawer dresser with mirror, black
lacquer upright armoire, black lacquer desk with chair, black
lacquer 2 each two drawer end tables, less the box springs and
mattress, as well as the Grandmother's clock or of furniture of the
same value.
14.

iwmdant

is hereby awarded the BMW,

Indebtedness thereon, and her watch.

subject to the

If at any time she falls

thirty (30) days or more late in the payments of the same, the
plaintiff at his sole discretion may pay the same and subtract the
monies paid from his child support and/or his alimony aforesaid.
15.

Defendant is awarded all other personal property of the

parties not otherwise awarded to the plaintiff above.
16.

Defendant

shall pay, and release, hold harmless and

indemnify the plaintiff for the remaining balance owed to Merril
Norman for his appraisal of Western States Coating & Painting, Inc.
17.

Plaintiff shall pay the defendant's attorney's fees in

the sum of $3,300.00.

7
18.

Each party shall cooperate and execute all documents

necessary to bring about the terms and conditions of the Decree as
outlined above.
DATED this

day of

, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

JOHN R. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:
John Walsh
Attorney for Plaintiff

7
18.

Each party shall cooperate and execute all documents

necessary to bring about the terms and conditions of the Decree as
outlined above.
DATED this

day of

, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

JOHN R. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the ^?S day of QifiirL I
,
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decrree of Divorce
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
John Walsh, Esquire
Attorney for the Plaintiff
2319 South Foothill Drive
Suite 270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

ft^.M.L
eliz\harry\cstnzo.dod

JOHN WALSH
ATTCNREY AT LAW
SUITE 2 70, 2319 FOOTHILL DR3VE
SALT IAKE CITY, UTAH
84109
Telephone: 467-9700

IN THE DJSTBICT COURT CF THE THIRI> JUDICIAL MSTRICT
IN AND FOTi SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE Or UTAH

-......--.

oooooOooooo-

DAVID COSTANZO

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

SHACNA COSTANZO

VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. 90-490267 5 DA

:

Defendant.
..............-oooooOooooo
Comes now the Plaintiff, David Costanzo, by and through
his Attorney, John Walsh, and complains and alleges against, the
above named Defendant, as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff filed for Divorce, on or about

July 1, 1990.
2.

Shortly thereafter the Court entered an order on

or about August 27, 1990, prohibiting the parties from jepardizing
any assets of the: parties without prior Court approval, or .lpproval
from opposing Counsel.

A copy of the same is attached hereto as

Exhibit A.
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3.

Based upon the foregoing the parties entered into

a stipulation and agreement, calling for che Plaintiff ro d ceive
certain properties in North Salt Lake.

A copy of the tran.scnpr

jb read into the record is attached hereto, as Exhibit B.
4.

Notwithstanding the express Court order prohibiting

the Defendant from selling the property, as well as che express
agreement made and entered into in open Court, the Defendant has
soLd che same and taken the benefits of the same as her soLe
and separate property.

A copy of the said Deeds is attached hereto

as Exhibit C.
5.

That at the time of the stipulation being read into

the record, the Court found that the property wa,s worth $20,000.00
(twenty thousand dollars) per aore.
6.

That by virtue of the foregoing the Plaintiff is

entitled to a judgment against the Defendant in the sum of
$129,720,00.
7.

That in addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiff

as awarded one twelve gage^ Browning Shot Gun, as well a?, one
twelve gage Pemtiintton Shot Gun, together being wcrth about^^/*
$1,000.00.
~ 8.

Plaintiff hss requested the said gun*, but the Defendant

has> rtfuyed to gfve them to him> and has apparently given their
to «• family member.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
above nanw-d Defendant as follows:
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9.

For *.n aware1 tti ct.e sum of $13Q ,72.0 .QQ.

10.

For iriteresc. court c o s t s , e t c .

11.

For a reasonable attorneys fees.

12.

For such othtir and additional relief as the Court.

VERIFICATION
STAIE OF UTAH

)
SS •

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j
DAVID COSTANZO, being firth duly sworn states that he
has read the foregoing and understands the same, and states that
the' same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief.
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Third Judicial District

JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2319 FOOTHILL DRIVE, SUITE 270
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84109
Telephone: 467-9700

MAR 2 9 1996
SAL I LAAClA/ofr

By.

V.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
DAVID COSTANZO,

FINDINGS OF FACT
and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAUNA COSTANZO,
Defendant.

;

Civil No. 904902675DA

;

Judge William B. Bohling

ooooooOoooooo
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on Tuesday, January 9, 1995, at the hour of 9:30 A.M. before
the Honorable William Bohling, District Court Judge, with the
Plaintiff, David Costanzo, appearing in person

and represented

by John Walsh, Attorney at Law, and the Defendant, Shauna Costanzo,
appearing in person and represented by Harry Caston, of McKay,
Burton & Thurman, Attorneys at Law, and the Court after hearing
the testimony of the parties, the exhibits admitted into evidence,
and then considering the arguments of Counsel, now for good cause
appearing, does hereby make and adopt the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the parties in the above entitled action were

divorced on or about November 16, 1992, pursuant to a Decree
of Divorce entered and executed by the Honorable John Rokich,
District Court Judge.
2.

That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, prepared

by Mr. Harry Caston of McKay, Burton and Thurman, Attorneys
for Defendant, the Plaintiff David Costanzo, was awarded two
parcels of property, one of 3.1 acres and another of 3.47 acres
in North Salt Lake, and the Defendant was awarded a single parcel
of 10.7 acres in North Salt Lake.
3. That shortly after the execution of the Decree of
Divorce by the Court, the Plaintiff signed a deed, conveying
all of his interest in the 10.7 acres to the Defendant.
4.

That shortly after the complaint was filed for

Divorce, by the Plaintiff, the Defendant brought a motion for
a restraining order, restraining the parties from jepardizing
any assets of the parties without prior Court approval or approval
of opposing counsel.
5.

Then in December of 1990, contrary to the above

stated restraining order, the Defendant pawned two shot guns of
the Plaintiff, which had a reasonable value of $1,000.00 total,
without either disclosing the same to Plaintiff or otherwise
obtaining authorization from the Court.
6.

The Court finds that this was a direct violation of

the said restraining order, and therefore the Plaintiff is
entitled to a judgment in the sum of $1,000.00 as the fair

market value of the said shot guns.
7.

That sometime in the month of April, 1991, the

Defendant signed two warranty deeds conveying her interest
in the two parcels awarded to Plaintiff, referred to in paragraph
#2 above, to the Defendant's mother and sister, without either
disclosing the same to Plaintiff or otherwise obtaining
authorization from the Court.
8.

The parties stipulated to the appraisal prepared

by Jerry Webber, as being admitted into evidence, which showed
the fair market value of the said two parcels in 1994 to be
$105,200.00.
9.

That the Defendant testified while on the stand

during cross examination that her original pleadings stated
that the property in North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the
Plaintiff and that she be awarded one-half of the value of the same,
with no mention that the property did not belong to the parties.
10.

That the Defendant testified while on the stand

during cross examination that her affidavit filed as the
Financial Declaration of the Defendant, that the property in
North Salt Lake, should be awarded to the Plaintiff and that she
be awarded one-half of the value of the same, with no mention that
the property did not belong to the parties.
11.

The Court finds that the statements made by the

Defendant that the parties had no interest in the said property,
is inconsistent with the pleadings filed by the Defendant, and
inconsistent with the affidavit filed by the Defendant, prior to
the granting of the subject divorce, and therefore the Court does

not find her testimony regarding the parties interest in the
subject property to be credible.
12.

That there was no testimony or other evidence that

contradicted the testimony given by the Plaintiff, regarding the
parties interest, and therefore the Court

finds as a matter of

law that the 3.1 acres and the 3.47 acres in North Salt Lake
to be marital property, awarded to the Plaintiff in the subject
Decree of Divorce.
13.

That at the time of the stipulation being read

into the record, the Court

finds that the Defendant did not

even disclose the transfers of the subject property, referred
to in paragraph #7 above, to her own Attorney, Harry Caston, as
he stated in open Court

that the parties interest was to be

determined at the time of filing of the Divorce, in July of 1990.
14.

The Court finds that by virtue of the foregoing

the Defendant did not negotiate in good faith when she agreed
that the Plaintiff would be entitled to the 3.1 acres and the
3.47 acres in the North Salt Lake, as of the time of filing of
the complaint for divorce, when she had already transfered the
said parcels in April of 1991.
15.

The Court finds that the Defendant agreed to transfer

the parties interest in the said two parcels as existed in July,
1990, without disclosing to the Plaintiff, his Counsel, Defendant
Counsel nor the Court that she had already transferred all of the
parties interest two months earlier, to Defendant's mother and
sister in violation of the restraining order that she sought
and obtained from the Court, in August of 1990.

16.

The finds that the negotiations by the Defendant

were therefore not only in bad faith, but that the transfer of
the subject property to be direct violation of the restraining
order obtained by the Defendant.
17.

The Court finds the fair market value of the two

parcels of property, of 3.1 acres and 3.47 acres to be $105,200.00.
18.

The Court finds that the pawning of the shot guns

and the transfer of the two parcels of property to be in direct
violation of the restraining order of this Court, and therefore
the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment of $106,200.00 as well as a
reasonable attorneys fee.
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court now makes
and adopts the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
19.

That the Court has both personal and subject matter

jurisdiction in this matter.
20.

That the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the

sum of $106,200.00 (one hundred six thousand two hundred dollars
and no cents), costs in the amount of $769.75 and a reasonable
attorneys fee.
Dated this

day of March, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDG

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW to the Defendant, by mailing the same to HARRY CASTON,
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, 600 KENNECOTT BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH,
84133, this J^rfday of March, 1996.

tfALSH
!Y AT LAW

